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Abstract
Immigration is an important problem in many societies, and it has
wide-ranging effects on the educational systems of host countries. There
is a now a large empirical literature, but very little theoretical work on
this topic. We introduce a model of family immigration in a frame-
work where school quality and student outcomes are determined en-
dogenously. This allows us to explain the selection of immigrants in
terms of parental motivation and the policies which favor a positive
selection. Also, we can study the effect of immigration on the school
system and how school quality may self-reinforce immigrants’ and na-
tives’ choices.
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1 Introduction
Many countries host a growing number of immigrants, many of whom are chil-
dren. For example, The US Census Bureau estimated in 2000, that 34% of all
youth aged 15–19 were from minority groups and one in five school-age chil-
dren live in immigrant families (Kao and Thompson, 2003). According to the
Innocenti Research Center, in 2009 almost a quarter of children are immigrants
in the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and the United States. This proportion
is about one-sixth in France and Great Britain (Alba, Sloan, and Sperling,
2011a). The future of these societies clearly depends on these children. They
certainly affect a country’s human capital through at least two channels. First,
these children have to be schooled, and by changing the school composition
they have a large effect on school quality and the performance of native chil-
dren.1 Also, many of them will stay, so their educational attainment will affect
a substantial part of the human capital of host countries.
Not surprisingly, the educational achievement of immigrant children and
their effects on the schooling system in the host country is a core concern of
policy makers. Studies like those conducted by PISA2 and other international
organizations have allowed for the empirical analysis of immigrant educational
success and the externalities imposed on natives. In many countries, a large
fraction of immigrant children face substantial disadvantages in reaching edu-
cational parity with native children3 (Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi1, 2008; Anghel
and Cabrales, 2010), but it is also not at all rare for some immigrant students
to be top of the class. 4 Researchers by now agree that immigrant students
perform differently by origin group (Levels, Dronkers, and Kraaykamp, 2008)
1See e.g. Albornoz, Berlinski, and Cabrales (2011) and references therein. A good
review of the literature on peer effects in education is provided by Sacerdote (2010). See
also Hanushek and Woessmann (2010) for a more general discussion about the educational
production function.
2Programme for International Student Assessment, http://www.pisa.oecd.org/. Another
good example is the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and
Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS) conducted by Boston College.
http://timss.bc.edu/index.html
3Australia and Canada are the big exceptions where immigrants often outperform natives
before controlling for individual characteristics (Schnepf, 2004).
4Card (2005) shows that of the 39 largest country of origin groups in the US, 33 groups
for sons and 32 groups for daughters have higher average educational attainment than
children of natives. Dustmann and Theodoropoulos (2010) and Dustmann, Frattini, and
Theodoropoulos (2010) show for Britain that at the end of compulsory schooling the second
generation of Indian and Chinese pupils outperform While British pupils by more than 30%
of a standard deviation in both English and mathematics. See also Dustmann and Glitz
(2010) for an overview on migration and education.
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and (Levels and Dronkers, 2008) and cross-nationally (Marks, 2005). Even im-
migrants from the same origin perform different according to their destination
country (Bertoli, Fernandez-Huertas Moraga, and Ortega, 2010, forthcoming).
Moreover, the immigration mix differs considerably across countries, which is
only partially due to colonial links.5 Policy variables in the host countries, like
the ease of immigrating and naturalization policies, seem to be important to
explain the different immigrant mix and the educational success of immigrant
children (Dronkers and Fleischmann, 2010).
In spite of the importance of the problem, and the abundant empirical
literature on the topic, there is relatively little theoretical work aimed at pro-
ducing a framework for the understanding of this phenomenon. Our paper
attempts to bridge this gap. The main novelty of our work is that we intro-
duce a model of family immigration in a framework where school quality and
student outcomes are determined endogenously.6 This allows us to address
two different but related research questions. First, we can explain the selec-
tion of immigrants in terms of parental motivation and discuss how different
types of immigrants are selected according to different immigration policies.
Second, we can study the effect of immigration on the different dimensions of
the school system, such as student effort, parental involvement, school incen-
tives and resources. Finally, we can also study how the endogenous response
of the school system to immigration is interrelated with both immigrants’ and
natives’ educational choices.
For this purpose we develop a new model of the school system, inspired by
Albornoz, Berlinski, and Cabrales (2011). In our model, children are short-
sighted and need to be motivated to study. Parents divide their time between
working and motivating their children, and they decide whether or not to
emigrate. Schools provide additional incentive schemes to enhance children’s
5In the Netherlands, e.g. two-thirds of immigrant-origin children have non-western ori-
gins with a Moroccan, Turkish and post-colonial majority (Statistic Netherlands, 2010). In
the US, half of immigrant children have a Latin American and a tenth a Caribbean back-
ground while in France a half of the immigrant children are from former French African
colonies. These numbers are taken from Alba, Sloan, and Sperling (2011b), based on
Kirszbaum, Brinbaum, and Simon (2009).
6While we are not the first paper looking at emigration as a family decision, the existing
literature mainly looks at a family consisting of a husband and wife (Mincer, 1978; Borjas
and Bronars, 1991) but not at the children. A noticeable exception is Caponi (2009), who
studies the migration decision from Mexico to the US. He distinguishes two functions of
human capital: it is used to generate earnings but also transferred to future generations
determining their future earnings. These functions are differently affected by the decision
to emigrate. Unlike the present paper, Caponi (2009) does not look at the interaction of
immigrants with the school system.
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learning effort. The effect of these schemes may depend on school resources,
which are decided by the education policy. The economic future of the children
depends on the learning effort chosen while at school. This effort determines
their probability to get a skilled job in lieu of an unskilled one. Parents are
altruistic, and the concern for their children’s future is modeled by assuming
their utility is a weighted average of their own material well-being and that of
their children in their future.
We first look at the the case of classroom homogeneity, where children and
families are perfectly assorted into schools, but countries might differ in their
wage structure or their exogenous school quality. In this setup, we determine
the optimal incentives schemes put into place by parents and teachers and we
study the immigration decision. We show that whether or not the more highly
motivated parents are more likely to emigrate crucially depends on two factors:
the exogenous quality of the school system, and on the skill premium in the
host and the origin countries. As in many standard immigration models,7 a
sufficiently high skill premium abroad is likely to lead to positive immigrant se-
lection. There are however two crucial differences in our model. First, positive
selection occurs through the future benefits to children. Secondly, if parental
wages abroad are too high compared to wages at home, selection falls on the
intermediate range of parental motivation. If the skill premium at home is
bigger than the one abroad, immigrant selection might even be negative. This
result is crucial to understand under which circumstances increasing immi-
gration costs will lead to a better selection of immigrants. Although these
results are derived for homogeneous classrooms, we show that the same logic
can be generalized to a more general model where heterogeneous parents differ
in their education concerns and talent.
One advantage of our framework is tractability. We can qualify a rich vari-
ety of policy strategies according to their capacity to attract more motivated
immigrants. More specifically, we study policies such as allowing immigrant
children to naturalize and the effects of unanticipated family reunification
program for temporary immigrants.8 We also analyze the possibility that par-
ents differ in their cultural values. This implies different preferences about
the values transmitted by the school. As a consequence, cultural alienation
may emerge for those parents/children with values substantially differing from
those transmitted by the school. We show that school cultural orientation
7When looking into the literature on immigrant self-selection and multiple destinations
the standard approach seems to be to use a variation of the Roy (1951) model which was
introduced into the literature on international migration by Borjas (1987). This literature
does not consider the interaction of endogenous school quality with immigration decisions.
8As happened in the case of many guest worker programs around the world.
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is a crucial dimension to understand how immigrants self-select according to
their school concerns. We show, for example, that cultural alienation may
lead to negative selection. This suggests that school flexibility to incorporate
new foreign values is a relevant characteristic to favor the arrival of the most
motivated immigrants.
We then turn to the question of the school effects of immigration. Once we
allow for classroom heterogeneity, we show that the overall effect of immigrant
children depends on the characteristics of the average native compared to the
average immigrant parents. We establish first that children’s learning effort
increase in parental motivation. This result links the effects of immigration
on schools to immigrant self-selection and how immigration affects classroom
composition. Of course, more motivated immigrants would involve more posi-
tive effects on the host country school system, but these effects are mediated by
the characteristics of both the native parents and the pre-immigration school
system. We can show, for example, that, although a negative selection of im-
migrant parents reduces the school effort of native students, this particularly
hits native students with relatively low parental motivation; a result that has
been uncovered as a regularity in many empirical studies (Gould, Lavy, and
Paserman, 2004).
Finally, we look at the effect of immigration on school resources in a world
with public schools to be financed by parents through taxes. We assume that
the policy maker maximizes the utility of the median voter parent, and show
that school resources increase in immigrant motivation. Hence, a negative
selection in parental motivation hits the native students directly through the
reaction of teachers and indirectly through a reduction in school resources
by the policy maker. This suggests that part of the potential deterioration
of schools with increasing number of immigrant children may be (at least
partially) explained by the response of the education policy to immigration,
not to the presence of immigrants itself.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the model of parental motivation and the school system. In section 3, we
study immigrant selection in a homogeneous classrooms and discuss under
which circumstances higher emigration costs can improve parental selection.
Section 4 turns to the question of naturalization policies and what type of
parent would emigrate if children were not able to come. We also study how
the cultural orientation at school might interfere with immigrant selection. In
section 5, we prepare the ground for analyzing the school effects of immigration
by introducing heterogeneity among parents. This section also serves as a
robustness exercise for our predictions on immigration policies. In section 6,
we study the effects of immigration on school system. Section 7 discusses
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further implications of our model and concludes. After each prediction of our
model, we document supportive empirical evidence. All proofs not in the main
text are gathered in a technical appendix.
2 Parental concern and the school system
In this section, we develop the basic model of the school system, assuming
that the individuals who go to each school have the same characteristics. In
other words, there is perfect assortative matching of students and families into
schools. This assumption simplifies the exposition considerably. Later on, in
section 5 we relax the assumption and allow for heterogeneity within schools.
Our model of the school system is inspired by the one in Albornoz, Berlin-
ski, and Cabrales (2011), where the school system results from the interaction
of students (children, who need incentives to put effort on learning), par-
ents (who work and set up costly incentives schemes for students), and teach-
ers/headmasters (who decide on the incentive scheme provided at schools).
We now describe our different actors in detail. We assume that every parent
has one child.
The students:
The students are children who live the present and do not worry about the
future. They perceive learning as costly, because they would rather play, and
do not internalize the future benefits of studying today. As a consequence,
students need to be motivated to exert learning effort. The incentive scheme
is put into place by parents and the school. Let c1 be the parents’ reward for
every unit of effort e and c2 be the school’s reward. Then, children choose e
to maximize their short-term utility:
U c = (c1 + c2) e− 1
2
e2, (1)
where 1
2
e2 is the cost of learning. Notice that we assume that parents and
school incentives are substitutes. No qualitative change ensues if we assume
the incentives to be complementary.9
The optimal effort decision by the children is given by
∂U c
∂e
= 0 = c1 + c2 − e
e = c1 + c2. (2)
9This is because the substitutability at the children’s utility level is mitigated by com-
plementarities elsewhere. Albornoz, Berlinski, and Cabrales (2011) discuss this issue in
depth.
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Hence, children’s effort is simply the sum of parental and school incentives.
The parents:
Unlike children, parents understand the long-term consequences of their
children’s choices today, namely how the child’s learning effort when young
influences the child labor market prospects in the future. In particular, the
probability that the child will get a high-skilled job equals the child’s learning
effort e, while the child becomes an unskilled worker with probability (1− e).
Skilled jobs and unskilled jobs are paid at a base rate of wages per efficiency
unit of φS and φU respectively. These base rates of wages can differ across
countries as well as between natives and immigrants. Hence a child’s future
labor market prospect is given by
(
φSe+ (1− e)φU) .
A parent has to split her total time T between working and providing
incentives to her child. How much time a parent dedicates to generating edu-
cational incentives for her child depends on parental motivation and the cost
of generating the reward. Parental motivation is modeled as the weight θ a
parent gives to child’s labor market prospect in her utility function. Parents
might care about their children because of intrinsic motivation or because of
their perceptions about their child’s talent. The cost of generating incentives
for their child is the foregone parental wage, given by:
w′ = v′φ′, (3)
where v′ is parental talent and φ′ is the parental base rate of wages per effi-
ciency unit. Parental talent does not only increase wages, it also decreases the
time parents need to spend for generating their child’s incentive reward. This
time is given by c1e/2v
′. Hence, the parental utility function is given by the
expression
UP = θ
(
φSe+ (1− e)φU)+ (T − 1
2
c1e
v′
)
w′.
Taking the optimal effort decision of children (2) into account, the parent’s
utility can be rewritten as
UP = θ
(
φS (c1 + c2) + (1− (c1 + c2))φU
)
+
(
T − 1
2
(c1 + c2)
c1
v′
)
w′.
With this formulation, the parent’s choice problem reduces to the incentive
scheme c1, which determines the amount of time dedicated to their children
so that we have
∂UP
∂c1
= θ
(
φS − φU)− (c1 + 1
2
c2
)
w′
v′
= 0,
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leading to the optimal parental choice after using (3), which can be written as
c1 =
(
φS − φU) θ
φ′
− 1
2
c2. (4)
Optimal parental incentives clearly depend on the school incentives, in fact
they are decreasing in school incentives. We now turn to the school’s problem.
The school:
Schools/teachers also fully understand and care about the future job per-
spectives of their students, assigning weight θT to students’ success. The
teachers have to decide how much of the time TT that remains after teaching
their compulsory hours they will use to motivate their students (such as train-
ing or preparing learning activities), and how much they will use for outside
job opportunities (such as private tuition) which are paid at wage rate ΨT .
For simplicity, we normalize teacher’s talent to 1 (which is equivalent to ab-
stracting from teacher’s talent), hence the teacher’s time spent generating the
reward c2 is equal to
1
2
c2e. Taking the optimal effort decision of children (2)
into account, the teacher’s problem is to choose the level of c2 that maximizes
UHM = θT
(
φS (c1 + c2) +
(
1− (c1 + c2)φU
))
+
(
TT − 1
2
(c1 + c2) c2
)
ΨT .
The first order conditions for this problem is:
∂UHM
∂c2
= θT
(
φS − φU)− (c2 + 1
2
c1
)
ΨT = 0,
leading to the optimal choices
c2 =
θT
(
φS − φU)
ΨT
− 1
2
c1. (5)
Introducing (5) into (4)
c1 =
(
φS − φU) θ
φ′
− 1
2
(
θT
(
φS − φU)
ΨT
− 1
2
c1
)
,
we can express parental incentives c1 as
c1 =
4
3
(
φS − φU)( θ
φ′
− 1
2
θT
ΨT
)
. (6)
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It is easy to see that the incentives set by parents c1 increase in θ and in(
φS − φU), decrease in parent’s base wages φ′ and increase as well in teacher’s
outside opportunities ΨT , i.e. if teacher’s have less incentive to dedicate time
to students because it is more costly for them, parents compensate for this.
Similarly, c1 decreases with teacher’s motivation θ
T .
Using (6) in (5) and simplifying gives us the incentives set by school
c2 =
4
3
(
φS − φU)( θT
ΨT
− 1
2
θ
φ′
)
. (7)
Given that children’s effort is the sum of (6) and (7), we obtain:
e =
2
3
(
φS − φU)( θ
φ′
+
θT
ΨT
)
. (8)
The effort of children is therefore increasing in the difference in the base
rate of wages
(
φS − φU), increasing in both parental and teacher’s motivation,
and decreasing in parental base wage and teachers’ wages for jobs outside their
teaching obligations.
The following assumptions are sufficient to abstract from corner solutions:
Assumption 1 2θ
T
ΨT
≥ θ
φ′ ≥ 12 θ
T
ΨT
Assumption 2 2
3
(
φS − φU) ( θ
φ′ +
θT
ΨT
)
≤ 1
Assumption 1 guarantees that c1 ≥ 0 and c2 ≥ 0 while assumption 2
ensures e ≤ 1
Introducing the optimal incentive schemes provided by parents (6) and
schools (7) into parent’s utility (2) and simplifying allows us to calculate par-
ent’s utility as
UP = Tw′ + θφU +
2
9
(
φS − φU)2(θ2
φ′
+ 2θ
θT
ΨT
+ φ′
(
θT
ΨT
)2)
. (9)
The first term Tw′ corresponds to the maximum earnings from working
(what a parent can get by working all the time), while the second term θφU
gives the parental utility if the child does not make any educational effort.
Providing incentives to children increases the parental utility whenever skilled
jobs are better paid than unskilled jobs; that if if φS > φU .10
10Notice that the third term of (9), namely 29
(
φS − φU)2( θ2φ′ + 2θ θTΨT + φ′ ( θTΨT )2) is
equal to φ
′
2 e
2 where e refers to the optimal effort determined by (8)
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3 Immigrant Self-Selection
There are two countries: Home (the source or origin) and Abroad (the desti-
nation or host). Both may differ in various dimensions but two matter most
for potential immigrants: (i) the quality of the school system and (ii) economic
opportunities. We study the role of each dimension separately.
3.1 School quality
The quality of the school system is captured by θT/ΨT . Assume for now
that this is the only difference between H (Home) and A (Abroad), and that
school quality is better abroad. This requires θTA/Ψ
T
A > θ
T
H/Ψ
T
H . In this case,
emigration occurs if the gains from emigration are bigger than emigration costs
F , that is if:
2
9
(
φS − φU)2(2θ( θTA
ΨTA
− θ
T
H
ΨTH
)
+ φ′
((
θTA
ΨTA
)2
−
(
θTH
ΨTH
)2))
> F. (10)
which after examination implies the following result:
Proposition 1 The cost that a parent is willing to pay to immigrate increases
in school quality, but it increases proportionally more for parents with higher
motivation.
Proof. It is easy to see that the cross derivative of left hand side of (10) with
respect to θ and
(
θTA/Ψ
T
A > θ
T
H/Ψ
T
H
)
is positive.
In other words, if one increases immigration costs, but at the same time
increases school quality, the selection of immigrants should improve since those
that get discouraged with the higher costs are more likely to be those for whose
the increase in school quality matters less. A testable implication of this
proposition is then that the school performance of immigrant children should
be better in countries with higher immigrations costs and high quality (public)
schools. In this respect, Gibson and McKenzie (2011) show that the quality
of Australian schools is a key pull factor for most of the qualified immigrants
arriving from New Zealand, Tonga and New Guinea Papua.
3.2 Economic opportunities
We assume now that school systems are identical but economic opportunities
are different. These are captured by differences in φ′ (base rate of wages per
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efficiency unit), φS and φU . We assume that wages abroad are at least as high
as wages at home. It can be shown that emigration from H to A occurs if
Tv′ (φ′A − φ′H) + θ
(
φUA − φUH
)
+
2
9
θ2
((
φSA − φUA
)2
φ′A
−
(
φSH − φUH
)2
φ′H
)
+
4
9
θ
θT
ΨT
((
φSA − φUA
)2 − (φSH − φUH)2)+
2
9
(
θT
ΨT
)2 ((
φSA − φUA
)2
φ′A −
(
φSH − φUH
)2
φ′H
)
(11)
> F
We first examine how gains from emigration change with parental motiva-
tion θ. Therefore, we need to explore the derivative of (11) with respect to θ,
which is
4
9
(
θ
((
φSA − φUA
)2
φ′A
−
(
φSH − φUH
)2
φ′H
)
+
θT
ΨT
((
φSA − φUA
)2 − (φSH − φUH)2)
)
+(
φUA − φUH
)
(12)
By our assumption that wages abroad are at least as high than at home,
the last term of (12) is positive. Notice as well that the first two terms of (12)
depend on the relative wage difference between skilled and unskilled workers
at home and abroad. Additionally, a positive first term requires the home
wage not to be too low compared to the wage abroad. The next proposition
clarifies these conditions:
Proposition 2 Assume that base line wages abroad are at least as high as in
the home country and that φSi ≥ φUi for i = A,H.
1. A sufficient condition for higher θ parents to be more likely to emigrate
is given by:
φSA−φUA
φ′A
φSH−φUH
φ′H
>
√
φ′H√
φ′A
. (13)
2. Immigrant selection will fall on intermediate-θ-parents if (13) is violated
and (
φUA − φUH
)
+
4
9
θT
ΨT
((
φSA − φUA
)2 − (φSH − φUH)2) > 0 , (14)
11
where the smaller
(
φUA − φUH
)
+ 4
9
θT
ΨT
((
φSA − φUA
)2 − (φSH − φUH)2), the
lower the θ associated with parent that decides to migrate.
3. The lowest θ parents are the most likely to emigrate if both (13) and (14)
are violated.
Proof. The last term of (12) is nonnegative by assumption.
1. Condition (13) makes the first term of (12) positive. By assumption
φ′A ≥ φ′H , so (13) implies φSA− φUA > φSH − φUH which guarantees that the
second term of (12) is positive.
2. Condition (14) makes the first term negative and the sum of the second
and the third terms of (12) positive, while the violation of (13) makes
the third term negative. Hence (12) is positive for θ sufficiently small
and the θ that benefits most from emigration is given when (12) is zero.
3. The sum of the second and the third terms of (12) is now negative, which
is only possible if φSA−φUA << φSH −φUH . This implies that the first term
of (12) is also negative. Hence (12) is always negative. So if there was
emigration, it is the worst types, in terms of motivation, who decide to
emigrate.
Proposition 2 sheds light on how immigration costs F influence the selec-
tion of immigrants and consequently the educational performance of immigrant
children, which is increasing in parental motivation. The effect of immigra-
tion costs clearly depends on whether or not conditions (13) and/or (14) are
satisfied.
When condition (13) is satisfied Consider first different host and ori-
gin countries for which condition (13) is satisfied. This implies that more
highly motivated parents have higher benefits from emigrating, and therefore
selection improves with higher emigration costs F . This explains why in des-
tination countries where (13) is satisfied:
(i) for a given origin country, immigrant children perform better in host coun-
tries for which the emigration costs are higher,
(ii) for a given host country, the immigrant children who perform better are
those whose parents faced the higher emigration costs.
12
It is easy to think of examples where case (i) holds. To begin with, he
condition imposed by (13) should be satisfied for countries as different as
Spain and U.S.. Also, based on cultural reasons, it should also be clear that
emigrating to Spain involves relatively lower costs than settling in the U.S.
Although not directly related to parents’ selection as in our model, Bertoli,
Fernandez-Huertas Moraga, and Ortega (forthcoming) show that Ecuadorian
immigrant selection to the U.S. is better than for immigrants coming to Spain.
Spain as a host country also provides an example for case (ii). Given
its language and the pre-existence of an important and organized Ecuadorian
community, migrants from Ecuador incur in lower immigration costs than, for
example, immigrants from Romania. Our model then can explain why Roma-
nian children do better at school than Ecuadorians, conditional on observables
socioeconomic background, to the point of getting higher scores than them in
Spanish language (Anghel and Cabrales, 2010).
When condition (13) is not satisfied The implications of the model
change considerably if we look at host and origin countries where condition
(13) is violated. This happens for example if it is mainly the unskilled jobs
that are better paid in the destination country than in the origin country. An
example of this situation is given by the immigrants hosted in Argentina from
countries like Bolivia, Peru or Paraguay (Gasparini, Cruces, and Tornarolli,
2009). These origin countries are characterized by a very high skill premium,
certainly as high as in Argentina. Also, the wages in Argentina are not that
much higher. In this case, the positive relationship between F and θ no longer
holds. As a consequence, in a case like this it makes sense for the destination
country to adopt policies to reduce F in order to attract immigrants with a
high parental motivation, irrespectively of their level of skills. This gives some
theoretical support to the strategy of Argentina, which has one of the most
generous immigration laws in the world (Albarrac´ın, 2004).
4 Immigration and government policies
In this section we discuss how different government policies can affect the
selection of immigrants in terms of the importance they attribute to education.
Most of these policies are taken for other reasons, so this discussion should not
be viewed as providing policy implications, and it is also very hard to do that
reasonably in the absence of a general equilibrium model. So our general aim
here is to study the educational side-effects of different policies which affect
immigration. Moreover, they often provide empirical implications which help
13
assess the descriptive validity of our model.
4.1 Naturalization of immigrants
An important issue is whether or not to allow immigrants, and especially their
children, to naturalize. Naturalization typically means easier access to better
jobs in the future.11 Hence, naturalization implies that immigrant children will
have a higher base-wage rate for high skill jobs. This does not hold not for their
parents, and therefore it increases the range of parameters for which condition
(13) holds so that only highly motivated immigrant parents are attracted. In
other words, naturalization favors the selection of highly motivated immigrant
parents and leads to better school performance of immigrant children. This
prediction in consistent with Dronkers and Fleischmann (2010) who study im-
migration in 13 EU countries and find that a significant macro-characteristic
for the educational performance of immigrant children is the destination coun-
try’s naturalization policy. In particular, the more generous the naturalization
policy, the higher the educational attainment of immigrant children.
4.2 Family migration versus migration of the head of
the family only
Many countries have tried to restrict the rights of immigrants, in particular of
temporary immigrants. Specially designed guest worker programs limit family
immigration or encourage immigrants to leave their children behind. Israel
recently passed a law dictating that migrant workers are not allowed to have
relationships, let alone children in Israel. Furthermore, children of migrant
workers already in the country are supposed to be deported.12 The guest
worker program proposed by president Bush (but not approved by the US
congress) was heavily debated. An important part of the discussion concerned
11Bratsberg, Ragan, and Nasir (2002) provide evidence that in the U.S. naturalized im-
migrants have a more favorable job distribution and higher wages than non-naturalized
immigrants. Moreover, naturalization leads to further wage growth. It allows entry into
certain jobs that are reserved to nationals only, but also gives advantages in terms of sig-
naling long term commitment and the flexibility to travail. The same results are found by
Steinhardt (2008) for Germany and Fourge`re and Fouge`re and Safi (2008) for France.
12As of September 2011 the deportation of children in state schools has been
delayed, but children not in state schools are planned to be deported. See
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/israel-and-palestine/100528/foreign-workers-israel.
and http://www.haaretz.com/news/national/israel-postpones-deportation-of-foreign-
workers-children-1.348152
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the pros and cons of opening the doors to the immigrant’s family.13
From our point of view, an interesting question is how are the immigrant
parents of children left behind selected. Immigrants who have to leave their
children behind cannot spend time with them to motivate their learning effort.
Schools may partially compensate for the missing parental incentives: recall
that c2 is decreasing in c1. As a benchmark case, assume that the best case
scenario for the children of immigrants: their school will motivate them max-
imally by setting c1 = 0 (as if both parents had emigrated).
14 Assume again
that all parents are equal. Then, the effort of the children left behind would
be e = c2 = θ
T
(
φSH − φUH
)
/ΨT and a parent’s utility from emigrating would
be:
UPA = θ
(
θT
(
φSH − φUH
)2
ΨT
+ φUH
)
+ Tw′A − F,
while the payoff from staying at home would be:
UPH = Tw
′
H + θφ
U
H +
2
9
(
φSH − φUH
)2(θ2v′
w′H
+ 2θ
θT
ΨT
+
w′H
v′
(
θT
ΨT
)2)
.
Hence emigration would occur if UPA > U
P
H , which requires
Tv′ (φ′A − φ′H) +
(
φSH − φUH
)2 1
9
(
5θ
θT
ΨT
− 2 θ
2
φ′H
− 2φ′H
(
θT
ΨT
)2)
> F.
The derivative of this expression with respect to parental motivation is
(
φSH − φUH
)2 1
9
(
5
θT
ΨT
− 4 θ
φ′H
)
,
which is positive for θ < θTφ′H/4Ψ
T . Hence the individuals with intermediate
values of θ are more likely to emigrate. We can no longer obtain positive
selection: the most motivated parents are unlikely to leave since emigration
harms the future perspectives of their children.15
13Critics perceived the program as a way of legalizing illegal immigrants from Mexico,
which would lead to a huge inflow of their children.
14This assumption might be less extreme than it seems. Remittance by immigrants is
often meant to keep their children in school or to pay for a better education by schools.
15Antman (2011) provides evidence that parental migration from Mexico to US reduces
the time the children left behind allocate to studying, especially for sons. Also for Mexico,
McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) find evidence of a significant negative effect of migration on
schooling attendance and attainment.
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One might argue that if children are not allowed to come, parental moti-
vation should not be an important selection criterion, as the effects of their
children at school is the only externality generated by motivation. However,
there are several reasons why parental motivation should be taken into ac-
count. One is that parental motivation is likely to be positively correlated
with work ethic. In other words, more motivated parents are likely to have a
higher work ethic too.16 This is reinforced by the fact that laws can change
over time and immigrants who were not allowed to bring their children might
later be allowed to reunite.17 Unless this is fully anticipated and temporary
family separation involves sufficiently low cost, our analysis would suggest that
a host country can get a better immigrant selection if family immigration is
facilitated from the beginning.
4.3 The role of culture orientation at school
Countries differ in their cultures. As a consequence, the values transmitted at
schools are likely to be different across countries. In order to consider the effect
of school cultural differences in the decision to migrate, we assume parents care
about the school orientation. We describe their utility by:
UP = θ
(
φSe+ (1− e)φU)∆ + (T − 1
2
c1e
v′
)
w′,
where ∆ captures the cultural differences between parents and the school. To
be more precise, let ∆ be
∆ = 1− (Φ− τ)2 .
16Although this link is not captured in the present model, it is easy to extend the model
to incorporate work ethic by letting parents allocate their time between leisure, education
and work and assuming that the same parameter affects the weight given to education and
inversely the enjoyment of leisure. This specification was used in a former version of the
model leading to qualitatively similar results.
17There are many historical examples of this possibility. Guest worker programs all over
the world served to establish permanent immigrant minorities. Consider for example Ger-
many, which signed a guest worker program with Turkey in 1961, allowing for temporary
immigration only. While many Turkish guest workers returned when they were supposed to
return, the agreement between Germany and Turkey ended in 1973 and many Turkish guest
workers established themselves permanently, bringing their families later on. However, these
parents were not positively selected, which might explain the bad school performance of the
children of German guest workers (Dronkers and de Heus, 2010). There are good reasons
to believe that new temporary immigrant programs are likely to lead to the same result,
since the pressure toward granting immigrants more rights and at least basic family rights
has increased. The United Nations and the International Labor Organization have enacted
a number of international conventions in this direction (Weissbrodt, 2003).
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In this expression, Φ and τ summarize the culture orientation of the school
and parent respectively. Observe that when they coincide, ∆ = 1 and thus Up
is the same as before.
To see how cultural differences affect immigrant self-selection, we assume
as before that the source and destination countries differ in wages. We also
assume that there is no within country cultural heterogeneity, and that schools
respond to this situation by providing the cultural orientation that parents de-
sire. From the perspective of the potential immigrant, this assumption implies
that she/he feels some degree of cultural alienation only when living abroad.
That, is we assume ∆H = 1 and ∆A ≤ 1. We can now state the main result of
this section:
Proposition 3 If wages abroad are at least as high as wages at home
1. Selection is increasing in θ for
∆
(
φSA − φUA
)
(φSH − φUH)
>
√
φ′A√
φ′H
, (15)
and (
∆φUA − φUH
)
+
θT
ΨT
(
∆
(
φSA − φUA
)2 − (φSH − φUH)2) > 0. (16)
2. Parents with intermediate values of θ are selected, if (15) is violated and
(16) holds
3. Parents with the lowest θ are most likely to emigrate, if both (15) and
(16) are violated.
4. If (15) holds and (16) is violated, there exists a threshold θ̂ such that
(43) is positive for θ > θ̂ and negative for θ < θ̂.
Observe that conditions (15) and (16) are violated for low ∆ even if con-
dition (13) holds, which is the corresponding condition for positive immigrant
selection in parental motivation in the absence of cultural concerns. The pos-
sibility of cultural alienation scares away the most motivated immigrants and
may even lead to negative selection. This imposes an important policy trade-
off for the destination country. The fact that school orientation may affect
selection implies that flexibility on the school orientation and incorporation of
some foreign values at schools could favor the attraction of more motivated
immigrants.
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This implication of our model might throw some light on recent empirical
findings by Dronkers (2010). In a cross-country comparison of language skills
using the Pisa data, Dronkers (2010) found that pupils from Islamic countries
have a substantial disadvantage in language scores compared to immigrant
pupils from other countries of origin, which cannot be explained on the basis of
individual socioeconomic backgrounds, school characteristics or the education
system’s characteristics.18 Given that the Muslim culture differs considerably
from the mainstream culture of most immigrant receiving countries, and that
Muslims have strong cultural concerns, our model predicts that in their case it
is the less motivated parents who emigrate. The educational effort of Muslim
children, as given in appendix, is lower than that of other immigrants through
two channels. On the one hand, they are less stimulated by their parents,
who care relatively less about their education. On the other hand, cultural
alienation reinforces this lack of concern even further. This problem could be
mitigated by allowing for Muslim schools. Indeed, Dronkers (2010) provides
evidence that a higher share of pupils with an immigrant background in a
school hampers educational performance (of all students), but if these pupils
have the same regional origin (Islamic countries; non-Islamic Asian countries),
a higher share of pupils with an immigrant background at that school promotes
educational performance.
5 Heterogeneous classrooms
The effect of immigration on the school system is multidimensional. How-
ever, the key common mechanism involves changes in classroom composition.
To analyze this, we need to introduce heterogeneity across parents/students
within classrooms. As a consequence, we allow parents i to differ in parental
motivation θi and talent ν
′
i. How do immigrants affect schooling in the host
country?
In the first place, immigrants bring a different mix of parental motivation
to the classroom. This directly affects the school incentive schemes. To see
this, we consider that school motivation is reinforced by the average parental
involvement in their children’s education. In this way, we capture situations
where teachers’ incentive are encouraged by interacting with highly motivated
parents. This assumption also captures the fact that it is demoralizing for
teachers to deal with disinterested parents or, more generally, with student
apathy. To capture this link formally, we postulate:
18As captured by the degree of differentiation in secondary education.
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Assumption 3 θT depends on the average parental motivation. That is,
θT = kθ =
k
M
M∑
i=1
θi, (17)
where M is the number of parents affecting the education of a particular school
class of children and k indicates the exogenous weight that the school assigns
to the future perspectives of their students.
Second, as parental involvement is endogenous and depends on peer effects
and school incentives, immigration affects involvement by native parents in
the learning process.
Finally, native parents can also react to new school incentives by modi-
fying their demands for school resources. This means that there will be an
endogenous response to immigration through the political process mediated
by school resources.
5.1 Optimal incentives and learning efforts
We start by establishing the post-immigration equilibrium levels of c1 and c2.
To do so, consider first the utility of a headmaster in a school with heteroge-
neous students,
UAHM = θ
T
A
Nj∑
i=1
(
φSei + (1− ei)φU
)
+
T − 1
2
Nj∑
i=1
eic
A
2
 γAHM . (18)
where γAHM represents the wage rate for jobs not related to the school work
and T is the total time left for the teacher after completing the minimum job
requirement of the teaching job. This formulation assumes that each teacher
is in charge of Nj children. The composition of Nj is NN + NA where N and
A stand for native and immigrant children respectively. Thus, (18) can be
rewritten as:
UAHM = θ
T
A
(
NN∑
k=1
(
φSeNk +
(
1− eNk
)
φU
)
+
NA∑
l=1
(
φSeAl +
(
1− eAl
)
φU
))
+
(
T − 1
2
cA2
(
NN∑
k=1
eNk +
NAS∑
l=1
eAl
))
γAHM .
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In order to save some notation let us define
ψi =
θiv
′
i
w′i
=
θi
φ′i
, (19)
that is, as the ratio of parental motivation to base line wage.
Also, as we will see school incentives depend on the average level of parental
incentives chosen by both native an foreign parents, so we define:
ΩI =
1
NI
NI∑
i=1
θiv
′
i
w′i
=
1
NI
NI∑
i=1
θi
φ′i
=
1
NI
NI∑
i=1
ψi for I = N,A. (20)
Notice that ΩN/ΩA expresses the average motivation to parental base-wage
ratio among the native and foreign population. Using this, it follows:
Following the steps in section 2, the optimal levels of incentives and the
learning effort of immigrant and a native children are:
Lemma 1
cA1l =
(
φS − φU)(ψAl − 23 θTAγAHM + NAΩA +NNΩN3(NN +NA)
)
. (21)
cN1i =
(
φS − φU)(ψNi − 23 θTAγAHM + NAΩA +NNΩN3(NN +NA)
)
. (22)
cA2j =
2
3
(
φS − φU)( 2θTA
γAHM
− NAΩA +NNΩN
(NN +NA)
)
. (23)
eAi =
(
φS − φU)(ψAl + 23 θTAγAHM − NAΩA +NNΩN3(NN +NA)
)
(24)
eNi =
(
φS − φU)(ψNi + 23 θTAγAHM − NAΩA +NNΩN3(NN +NA)
)
. (25)
Proof. See the appendix.
It is clear now that the learning effort of an immigrant child relative to
that of a native child depends on their parents’ characteristics, such as the
base wage per efficiency unit or work ethic. To see this, we have to consider
eAi − eNj =
(
ψAi − ψNj
) (
φS − φU) = ( θAi
φ′iA
− θ
N
j
φ′jN
)(
φS − φU) ,
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which implies that for immigrant children to make greater effort in average
than the natives, the following condition has to be satisfied:
1
NA
∑
i∈NA
eAi >
1
NN
∑
i∈NN
eNi whenever
1
NA
∑
i∈NA
θAl
φ′lA
>
1
NN
∑
i∈NN
θNi
φ′lN
.
Having established this, the next proposition follows immediately:
Proposition 4 The children of immigrants exert more effort at school than
natives if and only if the average of the ratio of parental motivation to wage of
an efficiency unit in the immigrant parents’ group is larger than that of native
parents.
Clearly, immigration affects education by changing average parental moti-
vation at the classroom level. Therefore, we have to (1) clarify the decision
to immigrate of heterogeneous potential immigrants and (2) establish how the
variables of interest (school and parental incentives, resources, student effort
and education outcomes) are determined by parental motivation.
Of course, the result holds when the environments of immigrants and na-
tives is the same. This clearly holds at the school level. In the country as
a whole it would only hold if all schools are the same and immigrants and
natives are equally distributed among schools.
5.2 Decision to emigrate in a heterogeneous world
In this section we look at the emigration decision in a heterogeneous world.
This is mainly meant as a robustness exercise in order to show that our pol-
icy analysis for the case with homogeneous classrooms extends to situations
where heterogeneous children school together. In particular, we will derive the
conditions for positive selection in parental motivation and argue when they
are likely to coincide with results obtained in the homogeneous case.
A parent i will emigrate from country H to country A if UAPi > U
H
Pi
. In
the appendix we show that letting ΩNA =
(
NAΩA +NNΩN
)
/(NN +NA) and
using optimal parental and school incentives:
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Lemma 2 UAPi > U
H
Pi
if and only if
Tv′
(
φAi − φHi
)
+ θi
(
φUA − φUH
)
(26)
+
(
φSA − φUA
)2( θi
φAi
+
2
3
θTA
γAHM
− 1
3
ΩNA
)(
1
2
θi +
1
2
(
2
3
θTA
γAHM
− 1
3
ΩNA
)
φAi
)
− (φSH − φUH)2( θiφHi + 23 θ
T
H
γHHM
− 1
3
ΩH
)(
1
2
θi +
1
2
(
2
3
θTH
γHHM
− 1
3
ΩH
)
φHi
)
> Fi.
Suppose the heterogeneity is such that the vector of variables
ξi ≡
(
θi, v
′
i, φ
A
i , φ
H
i
) ∈ Ξ,
characterizing each individual belongs to a finite set of types Ξ. At the same
time the variable Fi follows the distribution F (.) in the compact interval [0, A] .
Note that according to equation (26) if an individual with type ξi and value
of cost of moving Fi wants to move, another individual with type type ξj = ξi
and Fj > Fi also wants to move. Hence, the equilibrium can be characterized
by a set of thresholds. For each type ξ ∈ Ξ there is some Fξ such that for all
i with ξi = ξ ∈ Ξ the individual moves to A if and only if Fi < Fξ.
Proposition 5 An equilibrium in entry decisions characterized by thresholds
always exist.
Proof. See the appendix.
In order to understand the effects of differences in parental motivation on
the receiving and sending countries we now use the link of school motivation
to parental motivation stipulated in (17).
Proposition 6 Assume that that immigrants are a sufficiently small part of
the population both on origin and destination, so that
∂ΩNA
∂θξ
=
∂ΩH
∂θξ
= 0
and that baseline wages are at least as high abroad as at home. Assume also
that for all i, i′ ∈ N, we have that φAi = φAi′ and φHi = φHi′ . Then, if we have
two types ξ and ξ′ such that θξ > θξ′ then under the following conditions we
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have that in equilibrium the proportion of individuals with type θξ that decides
to emigrate is larger than the proportion of emigrants with type θξ′:(
φSA − φUA
)2
φA
≥
(
φSH − φUH
)2
φH
(27)
2kA
γAHM
θNA − 2kH
γHHM
θH ≥ ΩNA − ΩH (28)
Proof. See the Appendix.
The first condition of proposition 6 given by (27) is equivalent to our con-
dition for positive selection in parental motivation in the homogeneous case,
namely condition (13). The second condition given by (28) is really endoge-
nous and it points to the differences that arise due to heterogeneity. To get
an intuition for its meaning it will be helpful to consider a situation with two
countries that are identical except for their wage structure. More technically,
assumption 4 holds in both countries, that is: both countries have the same ex-
ogenous school qualities, 2kA/γ
A
HM = 2kH/γ
H
HM ; the same initial distribution
of parental motivation; the same distribution of parental motivation among
skill groups; and the same proportion of people in skilled employment.
Under these conditions, inequality (28) definitely holds. To see this, notice
that due to the equality in exogenous school quality, condition (28) reduces
to ΩNA ≤ ΩH , or equivalently 1NH
∑
θi/φ
H
i ≥ 1NNA
∑
θj/φ
NA
j . This is true
since wages in country A are at least as high as wages in country H, and
the distribution of parental motivation among skill groups is identical. This
argument shows that the first wave of immigrants is likely to attract highly
motivated parents under the same conditions as in homogeneous classrooms.
Obviously if the exogenous school quality is better abroad than at home so
that 2kA/γ
A
HM > 2kH/γ
H
HM , condition (28) is relaxed.
6 Heterogeneous parental motivation and its
implications
6.1 Motivation, school quality and student effort
Immigration affects the composition of a class and therefore its impact on
results by changing the averages of motivation across classrooms. To show
this, we have to establish the condition under which school quality and student
effort depend on parental motivation.
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Using, assumption (3) and equation (23), we can express the school incen-
tives in a more general way:
c2 =
2
(
φSl − φUl
)
3N
Nl∑
i=1
((
2k
γlHM
− 1
φ′i
)
θi
)
, (29)
where the index l refers to the country in question and Nl refers to the total
number of students at a school in country l.
Since
sign
∂cA2j
∂θi
= sign
(
2k
γlHM
− 1
φ′i
)
,
the incentives provided by schools (29) increase in parental motivation for
parents whose wages are such that 2k/γlHM > 1/φ
′
i and decrease in parental
motivation for parents with wages such that 2k/γlHM < 1/φ
′
i .
On the other hand, schools will only provide positive incentives if
Nl∑
i=1
(
2k
γlHM
− 1
φ′i
)
θi > 0.
Clearly, in a world with unskilled and skilled parents, where wages are
described by φU and φS = αφU , with α > 1, the following condition is sufficient
to guarantee that school incentives increase in average parental involvement:
Assumption 4 2k
γlHM
> 1
φi
′
for all i.
Assumption 4 can be rewritten as 2φ′i > γ
l
HM/k for all i where γ
l
HM/k is
the inverse of school quality. The assumption therefore states that parental
baseline wages cannot be too low compared to the ratio of school’s opportunity
cost of providing students incentives to the weight schools give to the future
performance of the children. This assumption will hold for high k schools
(schools highly concerned with their students’ future) and for countries where
γlHM is low. Arguably, assumption 4 is relatively mild for countries targeted
by migration.
Assumption 4 allows for positive school incentives both when children are
schooled according to their parental skill levels and when parental skill levels
are mixed across schools. In the latter case, it is still possible to guarantee
that school incentives are positive even if assumption 4 is violated. This is
possible if:
1
N
∑
i∈N
(
2k
γlHM
− 1
φ′i
)
θi > 0.
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This can be nicely illustrated in a world where parents either have a skilled
or an unskilled wage and let φS = αφU where φU < γlHM/k < αφ
U .19 Then
schools set positive incentives if
1
N
∑
i∈N
(
2k
γlHM
− 1
φ′i
)
θi =
1
NS +NU
∑
i∈NS∪NU
(
2k
γlHM
− 1
φ′i
)
θi > 0 (30)
where NS/NU is the number of skilled/unskilled workers respectively.
Condition (30) is equivalent to:∑
i∈NS θi∑
i∈NU θi
>
1
φU
− 2k
γlHM
2k
γlHM
− 1
αφU
=
α
(
γlHM − 2kφU
)
2kαφU − γlHM
.
Define β =
∑NS
i=1 θi/
∑NU
i=1 θi; that is, the total parental motivation is higher
for skilled parents than for unskilled parents if and only if β > 1. Then we
obtain
1
NS +NU
NS+NU∑
i=1
(
2k
γlHM
− 1
φ′i
)
θi > 0⇐⇒ φU > (β + α) γ
l
HM
2 (1 + β) kα
.
Notice that the right hand side is decreasing in β. Therefore, we obtain
a weaker condition, which may be satisfied if the total parental motivation is
lower for unskilled than skilled workers. We can state now the following result:
Proposition 7 1. Under assumption 4 overall school incentives increase
in parental motivation.
2. Consider a world where parents either have a skilled or unskilled job
with wages φS = αφU and φU < γlHM/k < αφ
U . Hence assumption 4 is
violated because it does not hold for unskilled workers. School incentives
are positive if
(β + α) γlHM
2 (1 + β) kα
< φU <
γlHM
2k
< αφU . (31)
in which case school incentives decrease in parental motivation of un-
skilled parents and increase in parental motivation of skilled parents.
Condition (31) is more easily satisfied for high levels of α; that is, in coun-
tries where the skill gap between high and low skilled jobs is big. The term
γHMj/k captures the inverse of exogenous school quality. A fall in exogenous
school quality will eventually lead to a violation of this condition, pushing in
turn school incentives to zero.
19The parameter α > 1 captures how beneficial skilled jobs are relative to unskilled jobs.
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6.2 Motivation and effort
School incentives are difficult to observe. For this reason, student outcomes
constitute a typical empirical measure of school quality. We therefore need to
examine children’s learning effort in more detail. Such effort may be expressed
as
ei =
(
φSl − φUl
)( θi
φ′i
+
1
3Nl
Nl∑
i=1
(
2k
γlHM
− 1
φ′i
)
θi
)
, (32)
From this equation it is straightforward to establish:
Proposition 8 Children’s learning effort is always increasing in parental mo-
tivation.
Proof. It follows from ∂ei
∂θi
> 0
Although fairly simple, this result allows us to establish some interesting
implications.
The channels through which motivation affects performance First,
even in situations where school incentives decrease in parental motivation, the
direct effect of rising parental involvement on student effort offsets its negative
impact on the school. Hence, the greater learning effort of children from highly
motivated parents must come because of the parents’ higher demands. The
empirical evidence of pushy immigrant parents is vast in the case of immigra-
tion to the US. As shown by Glick and White (2004) and Hao and Bonstead-
Bruns (1998), immigrant parents are associated with greater demands on their
children in terms of school engagement and academic achievement. Keller and
Tillman (2008) find that both parental and self-reported expectations have sig-
nificant direct effects on college attendance. Goyette and Xie (1999) provide
evidence that in the US the behaviors and expectations of Asian immigrant
parents’ tend to raise their children’s school attendance above the average.
Effects on natives and immigrants Turning to the effect of immigra-
tion on schooling, proposition 8 implies that this effect is mediated by parental
characteristics and the way immigrants are schooled. To see this more clearly,
we can rewrite (32) and obtain:
ei =
(
φSl − φUl
) θi
φ′i
+
1
2
cl2. (33)
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This expression allows us to analyze how immigration affects the perfor-
mance of native pupils. For a given school, the relative effect of immigration
on native children varies across their parent characteristics, which are captured
by ψi = θi/φ
′
i. A change in c
l
2 simply shifts the initial c1 up (if immigrants are
better in average) or down (otherwise), and therefore the effect on ei is lower
the higher the initial c1 or equivalently, for children associated with a higher
ψi. In other words, the performance of disadvantaged children (low ψi par-
ents) is more affected by immigration than their advantaged classmates (high
ψi parents). The evidence for this is very strong. Gould, Lavy, and Paserman
(2009) provide very suggestive evidence for this prediction. Focusing on the
mass migration wave from the former Soviet Union to Israel in the early 1990s,
they find a negative effect of immigrants on native outcomes which is larger for
natives from a more disadvantaged social background. Similarly, Betts (1998)
shows that immigration reduces the probability of completing high-schools for
American-native minorities (Blacks and Hispanics). No negative effect of im-
migrants is found for non minority groups. Finally Brunello and Rocco (2011)
study whether a higher share of immigrant pupils affects the school perfor-
mance of natives using aggregate multi-country data from PISA. They find
evidence of a negative and statistically significant relationship but the size
of the estimated effect is small and it is bigger for natives with a relatively
disadvantaged parental background.
Expression (33) also allows us to examine the effect of schools on immigrant
performance. A typical measure of school quality is the the pre-immigration
performance or general performance of its native pupils. As discussed above,
overall native performance is partly driven by c2. According to (33), a higher
level of c2 would benefit all children at the school, and hence this would include
the immigrant children. This is consistent with the vast evidence suggesting
that better schools benefit immigrants (Dronkers and Fleischmann, 2010). The
“Operation Solomon”provides a natural experiment for this result. This refers
to the exodus of 15,000 Ethiopian immigrants, who were airborne to Israel
within 36 hours in May 1991. Importantly, they were randomly sorted across
the country. According to our model the average performance of those im-
migrants who were randomly placed into better schools should be higher. As
shown by Gould, Lavy, and Paserman (2004), this was exactly the case: those
Ethiopians who were assigned to better elementary schools20 had better results
in high school.
20The measure of better elementary schools used by Gould, Lavy, and Paserman (2004)
was the average standardized maths scores before Ethiopian entered or other environmental
measures such as welfare rate and average high school matriculation rate.
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The impact on segregation and of segregation So far, we have al-
ways considered exogenous classroom composition. But a corollary of the
previous point is that the selection of immigrants can have important implica-
tions on school segregation. If the selection of immigrants is negative, or even
if positive, it involves mainly unskilled workers, this can easily lead to a flight
from some schools into others. In many countries this implies a flight to the
private schools sector. Indeed, Betts and Fairlie (2003) find that American na-
tive students fly toward private secondary schools in response to the influx of
immigrants into public institutions. Also, Berniell (2010) discussing the mas-
sive recent flow of immigrants into Spain shows that “in 1998-99, when the
fraction of immigrants in Madrid was only 2.6%, about 59% of natives were
attending public schools, while one decade later -when immigrants comprised
17% of total population roughly 50% of natives chose public institutions. On
the other hand, in 1998-99 only 68% of immigrant parents were choosing public
schools, while in 2008-09 this number raised to 77%.”
In a world with skilled and unskilled workers school, incentives can also be
rewritten as
c2 =
2
(
φSl − φUl
)
3 (NU +NS)
((
2k
γlHM
− 1
φU
)
NUθU +
(
2k
γlHM
− 1
αφU
)
NSθS
)
. (34)
Consider situations where schools are segregated by the skill level of par-
ents, i.e. children of unskilled workers are schooled together and so are children
of skilled workers, the natives always benefit if immigrants have a high parental
motivation, and they suffer otherwise. In countries where children of skilled
and unskilled parents are schooled together and randomly assigned to schools,
immigration is likely to change the skilled/unskilled composition of the class-
room. If immigrants are positively selected according to parental motivation
and are only high-skilled workers matched to high-skilled jobs, the effect on
native student’s effort is positive. If, however, immigrants are all positively
selected but unskilled and the overall classroom size is constant, then selec-
tion has to be extremely restrictive in the sense that only immigrants with the
highest motivation are admitted for the overall effect on school incentives to
be positive. Similarly, a negative selection of only unskilled immigrants will al-
ways affect natives negatively, while a negative selection of skilled immigrants
has to be extremely negative to have the same effect. If skilled and unskilled
immigrants come in the same proportion than skilled and unskilled natives, a
positive (negative) selection in parental motivation will always benefit (harm)
native children.
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6.3 Motivation and school resources.
We are now going to endogenize school resources to see whether some new
effects arise from the feedback between immigrants’ ethos and resource provi-
sion. Let us denote by rj the amount of resources an administration gives to
a particular school. This could be thought of as class size (or teacher student
ratio) as well as other resources, such as support to teaching staff, computers
and other means of making the provision of incentives easier for teachers. The
levels of resources, rj is announced by the policymaker before parents and
headmasters decide on the level of incentives, so they take rj as given when
they make their decisions. Given rj the utility of a headmaster is now:
UAHM = θ
T
A
Nj∑
i=1
(
φSei + (1− ei)φU
)
+
T − 1
2rj
Nj∑
i=1
eic
A
2
 γAHM . (35)
Following the previous analysis, we can obtain the equilibrium values of
the key variables of the school system:
Lemma 3
cA1l =
(
φS − φU)(ψAl − 23 rjθTAγAHM + NAΩA +NNΩN3(NN +NA)
)
. (36)
cN1i =
(
φS − φU)(ψNi − 23 rjθTAγAHM + NAΩA +NNΩN3(NN +NA)
)
(37)
and for school incentives:
cA2j =
2
3
(
φS − φU)(2rjθTA
γAHM
− NAΩA +NNΩN
(NN +NA)
)
. (38)
The learning effort of an immigrant child and a native child given by (2) are
therefore
eAi =
(
φS − φU)(ψAl + 23 rjθTAγAHM − NAΩA +NNΩN3(NN +NA)
)
. (39)
eNi =
(
φS − φU)(ψNi + 23 rjθTAγAHM − NAΩA +NNΩN3(NN +NA)
)
. (40)
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Proof. See the appendix.
Now we introduce the utility of the policymaker who decides the level of
resources for the schools. The policymaker maximizes the complete utility
of the (median-voter) parent (denoted by P¯i) which requires adding the cost
of the school resources (rj). This median-voter is a native, and in fact we
are choosing him as the median of the natives, as in most countries first-
generation immigrants do not get the right of vote, or they get it when they
are naturalized at which point most of their children will have already gone (at
least partially) through the education system.21 The costs of resources rj are
paid by parents through general taxation, which parents care about, and are
internalized by the policymaker when deciding rj. We assume that all schools
have the same resources so that rj = r for all j. Resource costs are assumed
to be quadratic.22
Thus, we can represent the policymaker’s preferences as,
UPM = UPM −
ρ
2
r2, (41)
where ρ is a constant parameter summarizing the cost of resources. Our for-
mulation assumes that schools are financed out of lump sum taxation and the
government keeps a balanced budget.
Substituting (40) and (37) into (41), and then optimizing UPM over r we
obtain:
r =
(
φS − φU)2 2
3
θTA
γAHM
(
θiM + φiM
(
NAΩA+NNΩN
3(NN+NA)
))
ρ− φiM
(
(φS − φU)2
(
2
3
θTA
γAHM
)2)
Note that resources increase in the motivation of the immigrant popula-
tions through two sources. First r is increasing in θTA which by assumption
(17) depends on the average motivation of the student parents. Secondly, it
also depends positively on the motivation of immigrants through ΩA. Hence,
the motivation of immigrants reinforces the effects of immigrants selection that
happen through c2, which we already discussed in section 6.1. Thus, a poorly
21To become a US citizen an immigrant must have been a permanent resident for at least
five years. Becoming a permanent resident also takes a few years, and we are considering
immigrants who already have children at the time they emigrate.
22This can be justified by taking into consideration that the state has monopsony power
in the market for teachers and faces a marginal cost function that increases in the number of
teachers hired. This is so, for example, because to attract one more teacher the monopsonist
has to pay an extra cost, since the marginal potential teacher needs a higher reward to be
attracted to the profession.
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selected immigrant population hits the native students (and the more moti-
vated immigrants) directly through school incentives, and indirectly through
a reduction in school resources by the policymakers.
Several authors have found evidence that bad immigrant selection leads
to a reduction in public spending on schooling. Using a quantitative model
of school choice and voting over public education Coen-Pirani (Forthcoming)
shows that education spending per student in California would have been 24
percent higher in the year 2000 if U.S. immigration had been restricted to
its 1970 level. As our approach Coen-Pirani (Forthcoming) abstracts from
illegal immigration and allows only native households to vote. His calibrated
parameters reveal that immigrants in California care relatively less for edu-
cation than natives, hence our model provides an alternative explanation for
his findings. The relationship between resources dedicated to public schools
and immigration is also examined by Dottori and Shen (2008) . They pro-
vide cross-country evidence (e.g. a mean-difference test) that countries that
experience negative changes in public expenditure per pupil from 1990 to 2004
(Docquier and Marfouk (2006) data set) are those with larger increases in the
low-skilled immigrants’ share of the population (UNESCO data). This finding
is consistent with our model, if low-skilled immigrants are also less concerned
about education on average than high skilled immigrants. Indeed, this nega-
tive correlation disappears when Dottori and Shen (2008) look at changes in
the share of immigrants with tertiary education and lagged changes in public
expenditure per pupil.As we also discussed in section 6.1, these effects will be
reinforced if, in addition, there is a flight of natives away from public schools
into private ones, as Berniell (2010) documents has happened in Spain recently,
for example.
There is possibly one more channel for immigrants’ motivation to impact
education. So far, we have assumed that the median voter is the median of the
natives, the only ones who can vote. But suppose that immigrants earn the
right of vote sufficiently early after arrival to the destination country. Then,
poorly selected immigrants would shift the median voter toward an individual
who cares less about education and hence lowers the level of resources even
further. Obviously, the vicious cycle of selection becomes virtuous in case of
positive selection. There is a higher level of c2, a higher level of resources r
and the immigrant effect may be improved by enfranchising the immigrants.
Another important observation is that our assumption on funding resources
implies that immigrants are legal, so they pay taxes. If they are illegal (non-
tax paying) but exogenous in number, we would effectively have a higher level
of ρ, which would entail a lower level of resources. If they were illegal and also
their number were endogenous, an increase in resources would bring more of
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them, and the effect is less easy to compute but similar to having a technology
with more rapidly decreasing returns to extra resources.
7 Concluding Discussion
In this paper, we propose a model of endogenous migration and human capital
production. The model allows us to understand for example the differential
selection, and hence performance, of immigrant from the same country into
different destinations. It can also explain why students from different origins
exhibit so widely different performances in the same host country, even after
controlling for observables. The model also informs about the effects of dif-
ferent policies in terms of the selection of immigrants. Finally, we can study
endogenous reactions of the school system to the presence of immigrants, and
through that the impact on natives and immigrants alike.
The focus of this paper is on the school effects of immigration in the host
country. However, it is straightforward applying our model to understand
the effect on the educational system in the source country. For example, if
immigrants were positively selected and, thus, the most motivated parents
leave their countries, this would imply negative effects on their compatriots.
In particular, this can lead to lower school incentives in the source country,
and hence to smaller learning efforts of non-emigrant children under plausible
conditions.23. Refocusing the analysis to the home country is an obvious follow
up of this paper.
We restrict our analysis to the effects of immigration on the school system.
Clearly, immigration involves effects beyond schools; in the health sector, in
the labor market and in many other socially important phenomena. Hence, we
do not provide any specific prediction about the optimal policy mix regarding
the number of immigrants. Nevertheless, our model uncovers important side
and feedback effects, which are generally overlooked in the design and imple-
mentation of immigration policy. Many labor market regulations fall into this
category. Consider the case of interventions affecting wages of immigrants, like
non-discriminatory policies that ease skill transferability of immigrants. This
may be achieved, for example, by recognizing qualifications obtained abroad.
Recall now that proposition 2 established that selecting the most motivated
immigrants required not only a skill premium that is higher in the host country
than in the origin country, but also imposed restrictions on parental wages.
In particular, the condition for positive selection is easier to satisfy for lower
23For example, if assumption (4) holds in the home country. The same would is also true
if assumption (4) fails but condition (31) holds and all emigrants are high-skilled.
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base rate of wages in the destination country. Insofar skill transferability of
immigrants determines the chances for skilled immigrants to get a skilled job
abroad, it becomes an important factor determining expected parental wage.
While it is hard to think of a situation where impeding skill transferabil-
ity would make sense in general, our model predicts that skill transferability
might worsen immigrant selection in parental skills.24 Moreover, any labor
market intervention that affects wages of immigrant parents would condition
immigrant selection in parental skills by modifying the opportunity cost for
parents to be involved in enhancing their children’s learning effort. It is easy
to show that imposing a maximum on the amount of hours will improve se-
lection by forcing parents to dedicate more time on inducing their children to
devote more learning effort; a more valuable measure for parents characterized
by higher motivation. Similarly, as proved in appendix A.8, higher taxation
improves immigrant selection provided the host country preserves the skill
premium advantage. Notwithstanding the importance of these side effects, a
rigorous evaluation of immigration policies requires a model able to capture
their general equilibrium implications; an avenue we leave for future research.
Another important extension concerns the interactions between the polit-
ical economy of the host country and education; immigrants, or at least their
children, often eventually achieve political rights and could importantly, and
perhaps unexpectedly, affect political outcomes.25
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A Appendices
A.1 Proof of Proposition
3
For ∆ < 1,we have that
c1 =
(
φS − φU) θ∆
φ′
− 1
2
c2,
where c2 is still
c2 =
θT
(
φS − φU)
ΨT
− 1
2
c1.
Thus,
c1 =
4
3
(
φS − φU)(θ∆
φ′
− 1
2
θT
ΨT
)
,
c2 =
4
3
(
φS − φU)( θT
ΨT
− 1
2
θ∆
v′
w′
)
,
e =
2
3
(
φS − φU)(θ∆
φ′
+
θT
ΨT
)
, (42)
and
UP = Tv′φ′ + ∆θφU +
2
9
(
φS − φU)2(θ2∆2
φ′
+ 2θ∆
θT
ΨT
+ φ′
(
θT
ΨT
)2)
.
remember we assumed that ∆H = 1 and ∆A ≤ 1. Bearing this in mind,
and drawing on the analysis in section 3, we obtain that immigration occurs
whenever
Tv′ (φ′A − φ′H) + θ
(
∆φUA − φUH
)
+
2
9
θ2
(
∆2
(
φSA − φUA
)2
φ′A
−
(
φSH − φUH
)2
φ′H
)
+
4
9
θ
θT
ΨT
(
∆
(
φSA − φUA
)2 − (φSH − φUH)2)+ 29
(
θT
ΨT
)2 ((
φSA − φUA
)2
φ′A −
(
φSH − φUH
)2
φ′H
)
> F,
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The derivative with respect to parental motivation is
v
(
∆φUA − φUH
)
+
4
9
(
θ
(
∆2
(
φSA − φUA
)2
φ′A
−
(
φSH − φUH
)2
φ′H
)
+
θT
ΨT
(
∆
(
φSA − φUA
)2 − (φSH − φUH)2)
)
.
(43)
A similar argument as the one used in the proof of proposition 2 now
establishes the result.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Using the optimal children’s effort decision, as expressed in (2), the utility of
the headmaster becomes:
UAHM = θ
T
A
(
NN∑
k=1
((
φS − φU) (cN1k + cA2 )+ φU)+ NA∑
l=1
((
φS − φU) (cA1k + cA2 )+ φU)
)
+
(
T − 1
2
cA2
(
NN∑
k=1
(
cN1k + c
A
2
)
+
NA∑
l=1
(
cA1k + c
A
2
)))
γAHM ,
which implies:
cA2 =
θTA
γAHM
(
φS − φU)− NNcN1 +NAcA1
2Nj
, (44)
where
cN1 =
1
NN
NN∑
k=1
cN1i, c
A
1 =
1
NA
NA∑
l=1
cA1l.
It is clear now that the incentives set by schools depend on the average
involvement of both natives and immigrants, to which we turn now. The
utility of a native parent in country A is given by:
UNPi = θi
((
cN1i + c
A
2
) (
φS − φU)+ φU)+ (T − 1
2
cN1i
v′i
(
cN1i + c
A
2
))
w′i,
leading to the following first order condition
∂UNPi
∂cN1i
= θi
(
φS − φU)− cN1iw′iv′i − 12cA2 w
′
i
v′i
= 0,
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so that
cN1i = θi
v′i
w′i
(
φS − φU)− 1
2
cA2 . (45)
Similarly, we obtain
cA1i = θi
v′i
w′i
(
φS − φU)− 1
2
cA2 . (46)
Thus, the optimal parental incentives are expressed by:
cN1i = ψ
N
i
(
φS − φU)− 1
2
(
θTA
γAHM
(
φS − φU)− NNcN1 +NAcA1
2Nj
)
. (47)
cA1l = ψ
A
l
(
φS − φU)− 1
2
(
θTA
γAHM
(
φS − φU)− NNcN1 +NAcA1
2Nj
)
. (48)
cN1 = ΩN
(
φS − φU)− 1
2
θTA
γAHM
(
φS − φU)+ NNcN1 +NAcA1
4Nj
. (49)
cA1 = ΩA
(
φS − φU)− 1
2
θTA
γAHM
(
φS − φU)+ NNcN1 +NAcA1
4Nj
. (50)
Notice as well that cA1 =
(
ΩA − ΩN
) (
φS − φU) + cN1 . Using this, cN1 and
cA1 become:
cN1 =
(
φS − φU)(4Nj −NA
3Nj
ΩN +
NA
3Nj
ΩA − 2
3
θTA
γAHM
)
. (51)
cA1 =
(
φS − φU)(3Nj +NA
3Nj
ΩA +
Nj −NA
3Nj
ΩN − 2
3
θTA
γAHM
)
, (52)
and therefore:
NNcN1 +NAc
A
1 =
2
3
(
φS − φU)(2 (NAΩA +NNΩN)− (NN +NA)θTA
γAHM
)
. (53)
Plugging (53) into (47), (48) and 44) we then get the desired result.
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 2
The utility of a parent who stays in H is given by
UHPi = θi
(
eHi
(
φSH − φUH
)
+ φUH
)− 1
2
cH1i
v′i
eHi w
H
i + Tw
H
i (54)
while the utility of a parent that emigrates from H to A is given by
UAPi = θi
(
eAi
(
φSA − φUA
)
+ φUA
)− 1
2
cA1i
v′i
eAi w
A
i + Tw
A
i − Fi (55)
Emigration if
UAPi − UHPi > 0
or equivalently
θi
(
eAi
(
φSA − φUA
)
+ φUA − eHi
(
φSH − φUH
)− φUH)+T (wAi − wHi )− 12v′i (cA1ieAi wAi − cH1ieHi wHi ) > Fi
(56)
Hence from the first order conditions on 54 we get
cH1i =
θiv
′
i
w′i
(
φSH − φUH
)− 1
2
cH2 .
Clearly, (23) can be used to calculated the incentives for schools at home
by using zero foreign students and replacing all the parameters for the country
abroad by the home country’s parameters
cH2 =
2
3
(
φSH − φUH
)( 2θTH
γHHM
− ΩH
)
. (57)
So parental incentives are
cH1i =
θiv
′
i
w′i
(
φSH − φUH
)− 2
3
θTH
γHHM
(
φSH − φUH
)
+
1
3
(
φSH − φUH
)
ΩH
=
(
φSH − φUH
)( θi
φ′i
− 2
3
θTH
γHHM
+
1
3
1
NH
∑
i∈NH
θi
φ′i
)
. (58)
and the total effort of the child is given by
eHi =
(
φSH − φUH
)( θi
φ′i
+
2
3
θTH
γHHM
− 1
3
ΩH
)
. (59)
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Using the optimal child’s effort at home defined by (59) and abroad given
by (24) and parental incentives at home (58) and abroad (21) and defining
ΩNA =
NAΩA +NNΩN
(NN +NA)
we can calculate
eAi
(
φSA − φUA
)
+ φUA − eHi
(
φSH − φUH
)− φUH
= φUA − φUH +
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)2( θi
φAi
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2
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− 1
3
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)
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3
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)
wHi
Hence the condition that people emigrate (56) can be rewritten as
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)2( θi
φHi
− 2
3
θTH
γHHM
+
1
3
ΩH
)(
θi
φHi
+
2
3
θTH
γHHM
− 1
3
ΩH
)
φHi
> Fi
or equivalently
Tv′
(
φAi − φHi
)
+ θi
(
φUA − φUH
)
+
(
φSA − φUA
)2( θi
φAi
+
2
3
θTA
γAHM
− 1
3
ΩNA
)(
1
2
θi +
1
2
(
2
3
θTA
γAHM
− 1
3
ΩNA
)
φAi
)
− (φSH − φUH)2( θiφHi + 23 θ
T
H
γHHM
− 1
3
ΩH
)(
1
2
θi +
1
2
(
2
3
θTH
γHHM
− 1
3
ΩH
)
φHi
)
> Fi

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A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Let I+ (Fξ) = {i ∈ N |ξi = ξ, Fi < Fξ} , and I− (Fξ) = {i ∈ N |ξi = ξ, Fi ≥ Fξ} .Denote
by N+ (Fξ) the cardinality of I+ (Fξ) and by N− (Fξ) the cardinality of I− (Fξ)
Then, under a threshold equilibrium, we can write for any vector of thresholds
F = (Fξ)ξ∈Ξ ,
ΩA (F ) =
∑
i∈I+(Fξ)
θi
φ′i∑
ξ∈Ξ N+ (Fξ)
, ΩH (F ) =
∑
i∈I−(Fξ)
θi
φ′i∑
ξ∈Ξ N− (Fξ)
.
Clearly
ΩNA (F ) =
N+ (F ) ΩA (F ) +NNΩN
(NN +N+ (F ))
.
Let for any i with ξi = ξ ∈ Ξ
Gξ (F ) ≡ Tv′
(
φAi − φHi
)
+ θi
(
φUA − φUH
)
+
(
φSA − φUA
)2( θi
φAi
+
2
3
θTA
γAHM
− 1
3
ΩNA (F )
)(
1
2
θi +
1
2
(
2
3
θTA
γAHM
− 1
3
ΩNA (F )
)
φAi
)
− (φSH − φUH)2( θiφHi + 23 θ
T
H
γHHM
− 1
3
ΩH (F )
)(
1
2
θi +
1
2
(
2
3
θTH
γHHM
− 1
3
ΩH (F )
)
φHi
)
.
Under these conditions existence is guaranteed by a straightforward appli-
cation of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, since G (.) is a continuous function
and we have defined F to belong to the convex, compact set [0, A] .
43
A.5 Proof of Proposition 6
Under the assumption that ∂ΩNA
∂θξ
= ∂ΩH
∂θξ
= 0 and individuals are homogeneous
in base line wages we can write
Gξ (F )−Gξ′ (F ) ≡ (θξ − θξ′)
(
φUA − φUH
)
+
(
φSA − φUA
)2(((θξ)2 − (θξ′)2)
2φA
)
+
(
φSA − φUA
)2 φA
2
(
θξ − θξ′
2φA
)(
2
3
θTA
γAHM
− 1
3
ΩNA (F )
)
+
(
φSA − φUA
)2(2
3
θTA
γAHM
− 1
3
ΩNA (F )
)
(θξ − θξ′)
2
− (φSH − φUH)2
((
(θξ)
2 − (θξ′)2
)
2φH
)
− (φSH − φUH)2 φH2
(
θξ − θξ′
2φH
)(
2
3
θTH
γHHM
− 1
3
ΩH (F )
)
− (φSH − φUH)2(23 θTHγHHM − 13ΩH (F )
)
(θξ − θξ′)
2
.
Hence we have that
Gξ (F )−Gξ′ (F )
≡ (θξ − θξ′)
(
φUA − φUH
)
+
((
φSA − φUA
)2
2φA
−
(
φSH − φUH
)2
2φH
)(
(θξ)
2 − (θξ′)2
)
+
(
φSA − φUA
)2
(θξ − θξ′)
((
2
3
θTA
γAHMj
− 1
3
ΩNA (F )
)
−
(
2
3
θTH
γHHMj
− 1
3
ΩH (F )
))
,
or equivalently
Gξ (F )−Gξ′ (F )
≡ (θξ − θξ′)
(
φUA − φUH
)
+
((
φSA − φUA
)2
2φA
−
(
φSH − φUH
)2
2φH
)(
(θξ)
2 − (θξ′)2
)
+
(
φSA − φUA
)2
(θξ − θξ′) 1
3
((
1
NA+N
NA+N∑
i=1
(
2kA
γAHM
− 1
φ′i
)
θi
)
−
(
1
NH
NH∑
i=1
(
2kH
γHHM
− 1
φ′i
)
θi
))
.
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Let θξ > θξ′ . By our assumption that baseline wages abroad are at least as
high as wages at home φUA ≥ φUH the first line is nonnegative. The second line
is nonnegative if
(
φSA − φUA
)2
/2φA ≥ (φSH − φUH)2 /2φH and the third line is
nonnegative if
(
2kA/γ
A
HM
)
θA −
(
2kH/γ
H
HM
)
θH ≥ ΩNA − ΩH .
A.6 Proof of Lemma 3
Using the first order conditions for children’s effort decision (2) we get:
UAHM = θ
T
A
(
NN∑
k=1
((
φS − φU) (cN1k + cA2 )+ φU)+ NA∑
l=1
((
φS − φU) (cA1k + cA2 )+ φU)
)
+
(
T − 1
2rj
cA2
(
NN∑
k=1
(
cN1k + c
A
2
)
+
NA∑
l=1
(
cA1k + c
A
2
)))
γAHM .
Hence
∂UAHM
∂cA2
= θTA
(
NN∑
k=1
(
φS − φU)+ NA∑
l=1
(
φS − φU))−(1
2
(
NN∑
k=1
cN1i +
NA∑
l=1
cA1l
)
+Njc
A
2
)
γAHM
rj
= 0.
So
cA2 =
rjθ
T
A
γAHM
(
φS − φU)− NNcN1 +NAcA1
2Nj
, (60)
For parents the only change now is that school resources cost money which
they will have to pay from general taxation, but given the quasi-linearity in
income of utility and that taxation is already decided at the time parents
choose their effort, the amount of those taxes do not affect the parental effort
decision. Hence for a native parent in country A
cN1i = θi
v′i
w′i
(
φS − φU)− 1
2
cA2 . (61)
And for a parent who emigrates from country H to country A is given
by
cA1i = θi
v′i
w′i
(
φS − φU)− 1
2
cA2 . (62)
Similar calculations as in Lemma 1 yield the desired result.
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A.7 Imperfect skill transferability
Assume now that people who have a high skill job at home do not nec-
essarily get a high skill job abroad but their job expectations abroad are
φ′A =
(
eAφ
S
A + (1− eA)φUA
) ≥ φSH . In this case the derivative with respect
to work ethic for high-skill workers (12) becomes
(
φUA − φUH
)
+
4
9
(
θ
( (
φSA − φUA
)2
(eAφSA + (1− eA)φUA)
−
(
φSH − φUH
)2
φSH
)
+
θT
ΨT
((
φSA − φUA
)2 − (φSH − φUH)2)
)
and we would get positive selection in work ethic if the skill differential is higher
abroad than at home and if
(
φSA − φUA
)2
/
(
φSH − φUH
)2
>
(
eAφ
S
A + (1− eA)φUA
)
/φSH .
The right hand side is smallest for eA = 0 and the constraint is most difficult
to satisfy for eA = 1. This indicates that reducing skill transferability might
improve immigrant selection. While all high-skill parents have more incentives
to emigrate the higher the skill transferability, this effect is biggest for parents
with a lower work ethic, due to their smaller parental involvement. Cutting
the wages improves parental involvement and also the selection of immigrants.
A.8 Taxation
Here we will show that taxation improves immigrant selection provided the
host country preserves the skill premium advantage (condition (13) holds).
Assume proportional taxes in the host country (tA), so people keep a
(1− tA) fraction of their income. In this case, immigration requires
T ((1− tA)w′A − w′H) + θ
(
(1− tA)φUA − φUH
)
+
2
9
θ2
(
(1− tA)
(
φSA − φUA
)2 v′
w′A
− (φSH − φUH)2 v′w′H
)
+
4
9
θ
θT
ΨT
(
(1− tA)2
(
φSA − φUA
)2 − (φSH − φUH)2)
+
2
9
(
θT
ΨT
)2(
(1− tA)3
(
φSA − φUA
)2 w′A
v′
− (φSH − φUH)2 w′Hv′
)
> F.
Let us call the left-hand-side of this expression G(θ, φ). Its derivative with
respect to θ is:
46
∂G
∂θ
=
(
(1− tA)φUA − φUH
)
+
4
9
θ
(
(1− tA)
(
φSA − φUA
)2 v′
w′A
− (φSH − φUH)2 v′w′H
)
+
4
9
θT
ΨT
(
(1− tA)2
(
φSA − φUA
)2 − (φSH − φUH)2) ,
which, assuming that φ′A > φ
′
H , is always positive if (1− tA)
(
φSA − φUA
)2
>(
φSH − φUH
)2
φ′A/φ
′
H . In other words,
tA < tA = 1−
(
φSH − φUH
)2
(φSA − φUA)2
φ′A
φ′H
.
Now
∂θ∗
∂tA
= −
∂G
∂tA
∂G
∂θ
,
so that if ∂G/∂tA < 0 for tA < tA, then an increase in taxation induces a
better selection of immigrants in terms of θ. Indeed,
∂G
∂tA
= −Tw′A − θφUA −
2
9
θ2
(
φSA − φUA
)2
v′
w′A
− 8
9
θ
θT
ΨT
(1− tA)
(
φSA − φUA
)2
−2
3
(
θT
ΨT
)2
(1− tA)2
(
φSA − φUA
)2 w′A
v′
< 0.
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